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Abstract 
While it is commonly believed that derivative instruments are a recent invention, we document the 
existence of forward contracts for the sale of wool in medieval England around 700 years ago. The 
contracts were generally entered into by English monasteries, who frequently sold their wool for up 
to twenty years in advance to mostly foreign and particularly Italian merchants. Employing a unique 
source of data collected by hand from the historical records, we determine the interest rates implied 
in these transactions and we also examine the efficiency of the forward and spot markets. The 
calculated interest rates average around 20%, in accordance with available information concerning 
the interest rates used in other types of transactions at that time. Perhaps surprisingly, we also find 
little evidence of informational inefficiencies in these markets.  
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1. Introduction 
It is widely believed that derivative instruments such as forward contracts and options are recent 
inventions despite evidence to the contrary. The first official exchange for trading contracts for 
forward delivery, the Royal Exchange (which later became the London Commodity Exchange), was 
formed in 1570 as a place where metal traders could come together. A formal futures exchange 
occurred in the late seventeenth century in the Japanese rice markets. Whilst the US has now 
become the world’s largest centre for derivatives trading, the first forward contract in the US (on 
corn) was not written until 1851 following the formation of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 
1848.
1
 Kairys and Valerio (1997) discuss a highly developed options market that existed for a brief 
period in New York between 1873 and 1875.
2
 
 
However, an examination of the appropriate historical documents demonstrates the existence of 
quite sophisticated financial instruments much earlier – for example, in England in the Middle 
Ages. Within the historical literature, there is an ongoing revisionism regarding the sophistication of 
medieval financial transactions. Many of the financial instruments employed were motivated by the 
illegality of interest payments on loans (usury) at that time, creating a need for relatively complex 
transactions that paid an implicit interest. For example, Knoll (2004) suggests that landowners 
would sometimes transfer the legal title of their property to a “financier” in exchange for cash. The 
financier would earn a profit by collecting any rents or profits that accrued to the holder of the land, 
and the original landowner had the right to reclaim the land at the original price on a pre-specified 
date. Knoll shows that such an arrangement effectively uses an options-based approach and the put-
call parity relation to artificially create the same contingent payoffs as a loan secured on property. 
Both puts and calls were written on tulip bulbs in Amsterdam in the 1600’s. 
 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Kroll and Paulenoff (1993). 
2
 For further description of the history of futures exchanges and related markets, see Bakken (1960, 1966) or Swan 
(2000). 
 2 
Not only options, but also instruments akin to forward contracts were in widespread use in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For instance, Italian merchant societies, most notably the Bardi 
and the Peruzzi of Florence engaged in forward exchange rate agreements for papal taxes collected 
in England.
3
 Advance contracts for the sale of wool have been identified by Power (1941, p.43),
4
 
linking production of wool in English monasteries with Italian merchant bankers. The monasteries 
frequently sold their wool up to twenty years in advance for prices agreed on the date that the 
contract was signed. 
 
The objective of our study is to use valuation techniques from “modern” finance theory to analyse a 
large number of advance contracts for the sale of wool that are documented from the thirteenth 
century. To our knowledge, this is the first study to comprehensively examine the information 
contained in a large number of these advance contracts for the sale of wool, and the first to consider 
the efficiency of this market. Specifically, we conduct two separate pieces of empirical analysis. We 
first use discounted cashflow analysis to calculate the implied interest rates for these transactions. 
Second, we examine the efficiency of the wool market by determining whether there is any lagged 
information from the spot or forward markets that can be used to predict the next period forecast 
error. To anticipate our main findings, this study adds to the growing literature documenting the 
financial sophistication of the medieval economy, demonstrating that plausible rates of interest were 
charged and that the wool market appears to have been informationally efficient.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers some background on the 
medieval English wool market in order to put our data and study into context. Section 3 discusses 
the sources of data, while Section 4 describes the financial methodology employed. Finally, 
Sections 5 and 6 present the results and offer concluding comments respectively.  
 
                                                 
3
 Goldthwaite (1985) and Kohn (1999). 
4
 Although Eileen Power’s work on the wool trade is seminal in this field, such contracts had already been identified 
and discussed by Whitwell (1904), Bigwood (1930) and Denholm-Young (1937, pp. 55-57). 
 3 
2. The English Medieval Wool Market 
The wool market was extremely important to the medieval English economy. Wool dominated the 
English export trade from the late thirteenth century to its decline in the late fifteenth century.  
Contemporary fourteenth-century opinion recognised the significance of the wool trade – naming it 
‘the jewel of the realm’. Its importance is demonstrated in the often quoted statement by Postan 
(1973, p.342) that, ‘The barons of England, sitting in Parliament, asserted in 1297 that wool 
represented half of England’s wealth or, as they put it, ‘half the value of the whole land’’. Other 
illustrations of the pivotal role of wool in medieval finances include the massive ransom of Richard 
the Lionheart, paid with 50,000 sacks of English wool, and the anachronism of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer sitting on the Woolsack in the House of Lords, as the symbolic recognition of his 
power.  
 
By the end of the thirteenth century, the heavily industrialised areas of Europe could not have 
existed without exports of English wool to support expanding trade in, particularly, luxury cloths.  
A halt in the export trade by Edward III in 1337 as part of his ‘Wool Company’ scheme brought 
whole areas of the Low Countries to the brink of starvation and economic ruin.
5
 Indeed, it is 
possible that such protectionist policies, introduced to finance war, ended the sophisticated and 
early use of forward contracts in the late thirteenth century between Cistercian monasteries in 
England and Italian merchant bankers. That some of these bankers were subsequently bankrupted 
has been widely documented and some of the blame has been controversially levelled at Edward 
III.
6
   
 
The peak of the export trade in wool was during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries 
with perhaps 40-45,000 sacks exported each year, gradually declining to around 33,000 sacks in 
                                                 
5
 This was part of a speculative structured wool deal to finance Edward III’s alliance strategy to the tune of £200,000, 
CPR 1334-38, pp. 480-2.  For the best treatment of the English Wool Company, see Fryde (1988, chapters 6 and 7). 
6
 See Hunt (1990). 
 4 
1355 and only 9,706 sacks in 1476.
7
 The crown’s decision to tax the export of wool encouraged 
(deliberately or not) the development of a domestic cloth industry and thus a move to the export of 
cloth. This domestic cloth industry was further strengthened by the immigration of Flemish cloth 
weavers, who perhaps kick-started the growth of the textile industry in England.  It could indeed be 
claimed that wool was at the forefront of the establishment of England as a European political and 
economic power.  
 
3. Sources of Data, Contract Details and Wool Pricing 
The unique data employed in this study are the details of recorded contracts between sheep farmers 
and, generally, foreign merchants seeking wool to export for textile manufacture. Information from 
over 220 contracts has been collected from The National Archives for the period 1200 – 1330, 
although the vast majority was enrolled between 1270 and 1310. Simple registrations of debt and 
more complex arrangements are found in the Memoranda Rolls of the Exchequer, longer, more 
detailed contracts in the Close Rolls of the Chancery, while the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer detail 
disputes over, and attempted resolution of, instances of default. Most contracts were written in 
medieval Latin, though a handful survive in medieval French. A sample translated contract follows: 
TNA E159/60, rot. 18
8
                   12 May 1287 
Recognisance of the abbot of Meaux. 
He came before the exchequer court and recognised for himself, his convent and his successors that 
he was bound to Ricardo and Reynerio Guidicionis, Henrico de Podio and Thomasino Guidicionis, 
and their fellow merchants of Lucca, in eleven sacks of the better wool of his house, pressed and 
packed into round bales and weighed according to the ancient custom of the house, to be delivered 
to the merchants in the quindene of the Nativity of St John the Baptist [8 July] 1289 in Hull, packed 
into the sarplers of the abbot and convent.  For which wool the abbot acknowledged he had received 
the full price in advance, which is to say 15 marks per sack.  And if the abbot cannot deliver the 
said wool to the merchants at the specified term, he agrees for himself, his convent and for his 
successors as abbot that the exchequer might levy the wool or its value from the lands, tenements, 
goods and chattels of the house. 
The contracts are highly detailed
9
 and give information on the purchaser and seller, the quality and 
amount of wool to be delivered, the due dates for delivery, and the amount of money per sack to be 
                                                 
7
 Lloyd, (1977, p.311, Table 19).  For a summary of exports, see Carus-Wilson, and Coleman (1963), especially the 
table, “England: Raw Wool Exports”, pp. 122-123. 
8
 All of the contracts under discussion are available at The National Archive (TNA) Kew, London.  They are now 
published in transcription and parallel English translation, see Bell et al (2006) and online at the UK Data Archive 
(www.data-archive.ac.uk), study number: 5325. 
 5 
paid, together with information on any advance and miscellaneous payments. Contracts could 
remain in force from just a few months to as long as twenty years. In total, they record 
arrangements for the delivery of around 5500 sacks of wool between both a small number of 
individual, lay producers and all of the major monastic orders (though the Cistercians predominate, 
contracting for exactly half of the total wool sold) and wool merchants from England, France, 
Flanders, Germany, Spain, and, most especially, the Italian city states of Florence, Genoa, Lucca, 
Piacenza, and Pistoia. The contracts were individually tailored by the counterparties since no 
formalised secondary market existed, and thus these are forward agreements of sorts rather than 
futures contracts.  
 
3.1 Why were these agreements formed and what was the nature of them? 
It is of interest to examine the motivations that each counterparty would have had to enter into the 
agreement. For the monasteries, their gains from the contract could be twofold. First, they would 
have known in advance how much money they would obtain for their wool for several years into 
the future, which would have enabled them to plan financially. Second, and almost certainly more 
importantly, they obtained large up front payments that could be put to immediate use for building 
works and the dual burden of royal and papal tax payments. Even though they were theoretically 
very wealthy in terms of their assets, many monasteries found themselves in dire financial straits, 
with large debts, and they were therefore in desperate need of cash.  
 
All merchants were keen to ensure a continual supply of high quality wool to fuel cloth production 
in the rapidly expanding urban, industrial centres of Flanders and northern Italy. Italian societies, in 
particular, sought out, and had the capacity to pay very high prices for, the highest quality wools, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9
 It should be stated at the outset that any study of medieval source data from a modern finance perspective is fraught 
with difficulty. The techniques that are in common usage today for the pricing of financial assets can typically rely on 
large quantities of readily accessible data of high quality. However, the records that were kept in the Middle Ages were 
far from complete, and there was no international standard in terms of wool quality, quantity or even exchange rates, all 
of which combine to make comparisons across different transactions difficult. For example, Lloyd (1973, p.2), argues 
that, “a stone … might weigh almost anything from 6 to 28 pounds”. Therefore, the calculations performed below will 
necessarily require a number of assumptions that would be unnecessary for research using modern data. 
 6 
committing their financial resources to producers over prolonged periods to secure them. Just two 
societies, the Riccardi of Lucca and the Frescobaldi of Florence, for instance, took over 50% of the 
total contracted wool, investing around £20000.
10
 In 1294, moreover, Italian merchants were buying 
from 49 out of the 74 Cistercian monasteries, which produced the best grade wool.  
 
Through the contracts, we would anticipate that the merchants should typically receive the wool at a 
significant discount compared to the prices prevailing at that time.
11
 Ignoring any time value of 
money, the average value per sack of wool specified in the contracts is some 20% lower than the 
monks would have received if they sold their wool at the prevailing price at the time that the 
contract was signed. Of course, this average figure masks enormous variations (a standard deviation 
of 22%) in the differences across contracts. An extreme example is where William, Abbot of 
Flaxley (Gloucs.), contracted on 21 November 1281
12
 to sell 8 sacks of wool (6 of good wool, 1 of 
middle wool and 1 of locks) for delivery on 9 July 1291 to Thomas de Basinges, citizen of London. 
The prevailing price for good wool at that time was 4,178d, but the abbot received only 1,120d, 
representing a 73% discount, although the contract suggests that there had been postponement of an 
earlier delivery. As one would expect, previous default seems to reduce the amount that an abbot 
could expect to receive for his wool by selling it in advance. Examining only those contracts where 
there is renegotiation following default, the typical discount relative to the market price rises to 
27%.  
 
Examining the size of these discounts is simply another way of looking at the large interest 
payments that the merchants received on their loans to the monasteries. Although it is impossible to 
separate the impact of the quality of wool from the implicit loan interest (aside from information on 
the broad quality categorisations described below), given the vast differences between the 
                                                 
10
 And this represented only a fraction of their total outlay in trading operations in England. 
11
 We would also expect that the prices would be lower than if they had waited and bought it on a year-by-year basis, a 
situation akin to normal backwardation of the forward prices. 
12
 TNA E 159/55, rot. 6. 
 7 
prevailing market prices and the prices that the abbots received by selling in advance, it cannot be 
said that the merchants were paying over the odds for their wool.  
 
Another interesting feature of the majority of contracts is that, no matter what their duration, the 
payments per sack for a given grade of wool remained fixed. For example, the agreement enrolled 
on 29 September 1298 between Abbot Adam of Combermere (Cheshire) and the Frescobaldi 
stipulated that four sacks of good wool would be delivered annually on 8 July for twenty years for a 
fixed price of £9.6s.8d per sack.
13
 One possible explanation for the fact that the prices per sack 
specified in the contract do not increase over the lifetime of the contract is that these amounts per 
sack were purely notional figures “for the records”. That is, the merchant had said, “I will pay you 
the sum of £500 now, and I want to receive five sacks of good wool per year for the next ten years”. 
It would not matter whether the contract stipulated that the sacks were all worth £10, or whether 
they were worth £8 per sack for the first five years and £12 thereafter. Thus fixing the amounts 
specified per sack as fixed through time was done purely for mathematical simplicity.  
 
An alternative explanation is that wool prices had no predictable patterns or trends, and the 
counterparties were aware of this and set the contract details accordingly. A plot of wool prices over 
the period
14
 demonstrates the stability of the prices within the contracts stands in stark contrast to 
the highly volatile series of actual wool prices. Therefore it was sensible, when viewed ex post, for 
both parties to assume that prices would not rise over the contract period.  
 
Some summary statistics for the mean annual wool prices from Lloyd for the period 1275 – 1322 
(47 observations) are presented in Table 1. As can be seen from the table, the average wool price 
was £4.62, with a standard deviation of £0.76. The series is positively skewed and is slightly 
                                                 
13
 TNA E 159/72, rot. 45.  Note that there is no conflict with the notion of normal backwardation here since there was 
no secondary market for these forward contracts and therefore no expectation that the forward price will move towards 
the spot price as maturity approaches.  
14
 Not shown due to space constraints but available from the authors on request.  
 8 
leptokurtic. While the series is persistent, with first and second order autocorrelation coefficients of 
around 0.75, the raw price series is just stationary at the conventional significance level according 
to a Dickey-Fuller test. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Calculating the Interest Rate for the Wool Transactions 
A first issue is the question as to whether the advance wool contracts are best analysed as forwards 
or loans.
15
 Eldridge and Maltby (1992) have investigated one particular thirteenth century contract 
between Fountains Abbey and a group of Florentine merchants for the advance sale of wool, 
arguing that this is equivalent to a modern forward contract. As they point out, these agreements 
certainly have many of the characteristics of forward contracts as the term would be understood by 
financial market practitioners – they are an agreement for the purchase/sale of a particular quantity 
of wool of specific quality grade. The dates and places where the wool will be delivered, and the 
payment schedule are also specified meticulously in the contracts.  
 
However, most historians would argue that such transactions were in fact loans in disguise, 
motivated by the illegality of usury (interest) at that time. The key point appears to be that no 
money would change hands on the contract signing date in the case of a forward contract, but the 
monasteries often received large up-front payments. Many of the contracts that we have uncovered 
make explicit references to up-front payments, indicative of a loan feature in the transaction. Even 
for contracts where no explicit mention of any advance payments is made in the contracts, this does 
not necessarily imply that there were none since the details of the transaction were sometimes not 
fully recorded. Equally, these agreements are not pure loans since the “repayment” was in wool 
rather than cash. Thus we conjecture that the transactions have both loan and forward contract 
                                                 
15
 Williams (1986, Chapter 2) argues that a conventional short hedge, where an agent purchases a commodity spot and 
sells the commodity for future delivery on a futures exchange is equivalent to borrowing the commodity and lending 
money. This is essentially a type of repurchase agreement, where the forward contract can be interpreted as a loan. We 
are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention.  
 9 
features, and given the kind of data available, it appears impossible to separate the two parts. Thus 
we are able to calculate a rate of interest implied in the transaction, which will be a composite rate 
made up of both loan interest and the cost of carry.  
 
The core formulae for valuing futures on commodities are the cost of carry relations, which 
stipulate that the fair price to pay today for delivery of the commodity in the future is equal to the 
spot price adjusted for the cost of storage of the commodity plus the cost of funding it. In theory, for 
the case of wool forwards, there is also a “convenience yield” to consider, since physical ownership 
of the wool would have been valuable in case of wool shortages during the lifetime of the contract. 
If shortages are deemed likely, the convenience yield will be high, although if merchants have large 
inventories, this yield will be small. Thus the relationship between spot and forward prices for wool 
may be expressed as 
 F0 = S0 (1+(r+u-y)T)         (1) 
where F0 is the fair forward price. S0 is the current spot price, r is the discount rate, u is the cost of 
storage as a constant proportion of the spot price, y is the convenience yield, and T is the time to 
maturity of the contract. Note that a discrete-time formula is used instead of the more common 
continuous-time equivalent in order to be consistent with the observation discussed subsequently 
that wool prices varied little within a year.  
 
Wool in the thirteenth century had very poor keeping qualities and therefore a very short shelf life. 
Lloyd (1973, p3) notes that “when a clip had to be held over from one year to the next it was often 
sold at a lower price than fetched by new wool.” Additionally, while the cost of storage would 
probably not have been significant as many abbeys had such facilities, in the cases that we are 
interested in there would have been no incentive to hold the wool back. Even if the current market 
price is below that which had been expected or that likely to prevail in the future, the monasteries 
had already agreed the prices that will be received through the contracts. Given the monasteries’ 
 10 
precarious financial positions, it would have made no sense for them to store wool when it could 
have been used to generate cash immediately. There is strong evidence in the literature, that 
medieval wool would have been almost valueless after a year. For example, a plea dated July 1299 
(TNA E 13/22 m. 70d.) between William Cause of Lincoln and Everard de Sancto of Douai, 
concerning a contract for delivery of wool between 1290-96 suggests that because the latter 
merchant did not collect the wool from the abbot for the final four years of the agreement, it totally 
rotted.
16
 Therefore, while it would not be possible for us to separate out the storage cost, and the 
convenience yield parts of the interest rate (u and y), we would argue that u would be small and y 
would be negligible. We do have evidence that the monasteries had large woolsheds at their 
disposal and therefore that the pure storage costs of holding wool are likely to have been small. A 
strong indicator of this is that the monks also sold “collecta” wool, where they gathered together, 
cleaned and stored cheaper grade wool from small local growers. The fact that they were able to do 
this profitably suggests that large storage facilities were available relatively cheaply. 
 
As stated above, it is the case that for the vast majority of contracts, F0 is substantially below S0, 
and therefore employing equation (1) to back out the implied interest rate (r+u-y) will yield a 
negative rate. The formula cannot apply in this case as a result of the loan component of the 
transaction and the associated up front payment. Therefore, in order to estimate the interest rate for 
the transaction, an alternative approach that focuses on the loan component must be employed. 
Following Eldridge and Maltby, we use a present value calculation and then we solve for the 
interest rate. To give one illustration of how this operates, consider the contract signed on 16 
October 1288
17
 by John de Bosco and Edmund Trussel with the Riccardi of Lucca for the supply of 
two sacks of good wool per year at the feast of the Nativity of St John the Baptist (24 June) for 
three years starting in 1289. The merchants paid the full eleven marks per sack in advance upon 
signing the contract. The present value calculation would be 
                                                 
16
 Everard claimed his non-appearance from 1293-96 was due to a trade embargo and blockade of the North Sea. 
17
 TNA E 159/62, rot. 14. 
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where adv is the advance payment received, i.e. the full payment of 11 marks (1760d) per sack  6 
sacks, t1 is the time from enrolment (contract signing) to due delivery for the first batch. This 
equation would then be solved for r. Note that the prices, P1289…P1291 to be employed in the present 
value calculation would not be the prices specified in the contract, since using these would give a 
calculated interest rate of zero. Given the illegality of usury at the time, the transaction would have 
shown an implicit rather than explicit return for the merchants on lending the money. Instead, 
following Eldridge and Maltby, we employ the spot prices that actually prevailed on those dates.  
 
4.2 Determining the “Spot” Price of Wool 
In order to be able to calculate the implied interest rate underlying these transactions, it is necessary 
to know the prevailing “spot” price, or the price that would have been paid on a particular date for 
immediate delivery of wool. Unfortunately, this information is considerably harder to obtain than 
that for advance delivery because most straightforward swaps of cash for wool would not have been 
recorded. The classic source of spot prices is Lloyd (1973), who provides information on wool 
prices by year and by region. But a casual examination of his Table 1 suggests significantly lower 
valuations than those in the forward contracts we consider. Munro (1978), indeed, has argued that 
Lloyd’s prices for 1294 are only 57% of the mean English abbey wool price in the Exchequer 
Schedule of that year. This schedule, arising from the seizure of the goods of foreign merchants by 
Edward I, details the merchant inventories of wool confiscated by the king and also provides the 
spot prices for monastic wool prevalent in England and Wales in that year.
18
  Munro argues that 
Lloyd’s prices are biased for that year since they are based on only five districts that produced 
relatively low quality wool.  
 
                                                 
18
 TNA E 101/126/7. Also available in a transcribed and translated form in Bell, et al (2006), Appendix I.  
 12 
However, whilst Lloyd’s prices for 1294 are lower than those for previous years, none of them are 
close to those contained in the forward contracts. The prices contained in Munro, drawn from the 
Exchequer Schedule, look more plausible, but also have drawbacks. Most importantly, the data are 
only available for this single year, and not for the range of years that we wish to consider. The other 
prices presented in Munro, Table 1 are obtained from a further two sources: the Douai Schedule of 
prevailing English wool prices on the continent (c. 1270) and the Pegolotti Schedule, a ready 
reckoner of monastic wool production and prices around the turn of the fourteenth century compiled 
by a Florentine merchant with experience of English market conditions.
19
 The average difference 
between the Douai and Pegolotti schedules is around 8%, while the Exchequer Schedule averages 
about 13% less for English wool. These differences are attributable to the costs of transportation, 
taxes and so on since the Douai and Pegolotti Schedules refer to prices in Flanders for variable 
dates. We will therefore adopt the Exchequer Schedule as our point of reference, representing the 
spot wool price in 1294.  
 
We then make an adjustment to these prices based on the difference between the average price for 
good quality wool that prevailed in 1294 according to Lloyd (£3.86) and Lloyd’s price for good 
quality wool in the year that the contract was enrolled and in that region. To give an illustration, 
suppose that the Exchequer schedule price for wool from a particular abbey is 1200d and the 
contract is enrolled in 1275. The mean wool price from Lloyd for that year in that region is £4.15, 
and so the adjusted price that we use as a proxy for the price that would have prevailed for 
immediate delivery of good wool in 1275 is 1,200d  £4.15 / £3.86 = 1,290d.20 
 
We are thus implicitly assuming that while Lloyd’s average prices are too low, the proportional 
variations in prices between regions and across years are accurate. We will also assume that prices 
                                                 
19
 The dating of the Pegolotti Schedule is controversial: Munro (1978, pp. 129-135). 
20
 For simplicity, when analysing the contracts, we subsequently convert all values into old pence (d). To remind 
readers of the conversion rates, one shilling = 12d, £1 = 240d, 1 mark = 160d.  
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did not vary within a year. According to Lloyd (1973, p5), this assumption held in reality since both 
the supply of and the demand for wool were known by the time that the sheep were to be sheared.  
 
A number of contracts were necessarily excluded from this part of the statistical analysis. A contract 
had to be removed from the sample if it did not specify the wool quality, if the abbey was not listed 
in the Exchequer Schedule and there was no nearby comparator abbey, if there were ambiguities in 
the contract (for example, if a contract states that 12 sacks are to be delivered but the sum of the 
sacks of good wool, middle wool and locks is 14 sacks), if a price per sack is not quoted, or if no 
delivery date is specified in the contract, or if there is no advance payment. The statistical analysis 
focuses mainly on good wool since it is this grade that is discussed in the Exchequer schedule. 
However, the spot prices for lower grades of wool are scaled down for inclusion in the calculation – 
this is discussed in greater detail below. We also removed from the analysis any contracts with a 
lifetime of less than 9 months, to exclude any contracts covering wool from the same season. 
Finally, for the calculation of interest rates (but not for the other statistical analysis), we only 
examine contracts where the advance payment constituted the entire amount to be remitted by the 
merchants to the abbots. Sometimes, the contracts make vague references to complex miscellaneous 
payments. This restriction was imposed to avoid the need to make assumptions about when the 
additional payments from the merchants would be made during the lifetime of the contract, unless 
the contract also specified this, in which case it was included in the analysis. 
 
4.3 Wool Quality and Its Effect on Price 
An examination of the contracts clearly shows that the merchants were sensibly willing to pay more 
for wool of higher quality. Wool quality varied substantially by region according to the breed of 
sheep and the quality of the land for grazing. In the contracts that we have investigated, medieval 
wool was classified into four broad categories: good wool (highest quality, fine wool), middle wool, 
locks, and second locks (locks are the poor quality, coarser, loose wool). A casual examination of 
 14 
the contracts that we have found suggests that middle-grade wool is typically worth about two 
thirds that of good wool, with locks worth around half that of good wool. More precisely, averaging 
over all of the relevant contracts in our sample, middle-grade wool forward prices specified in the 
contracts are 68% of good wool prices. Similarly, locks are worth 50% of good wool prices. Finally, 
collecta wool (good wool that an abbey would collect in its stores from other local non-monastic 
producers to be sold together) is worth 83% of non-collecta good wool. Since spot price data are 
only available for good quality wool, we use these percentages to convert the good wool spot prices 
in the present value calculations to obtain appropriate spot prices for lower grades of wool.  
 
There is significant evidence in these contracts that religious orders obtained more for their wool 
than non-monastic sellers. The average discount of the contract price per sack from the prevailing 
market price is 18% for religious orders but 25% for others. It also appears that some religious 
orders were systematically able to obtain more for their wool than others. It is commonly thought 
that Cistercian wool was particularly highly valued because it was not only of good quality, but it 
was also subjected to a highly skilled preparation before delivery. Indeed, in sixty contracts 
predominantly, though not exclusively, made with Cistercian monks, merchants demanded 
thorough washing, drying, sorting, weighing and specialized packaging of the purchased wool, 
time-consuming and costly processes in which Cistercian abbeys excelled. The Exchequer 
Schedule
21
 explicitly states the expenses of the wool dresser, which usually amounted to around 
2%-4% of the total value of the wool. 
 
4.4 Risks to the Counterparties 
In the context of futures contracts, where there would be no counterparty risk, the appropriate 
discount rate would be the risk-free rate, but in the present context it is likely that not only did such 
risks exist, but there could also have been differential levels of risk between the merchants and the 
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abbots.  The lack of storability of medieval wool beyond a few months implies that it would not 
have been possible to hedge a long dated forward position.  Therefore, both the suppliers of wool 
and the purchasing merchants would have faced risks when entering into a contractual agreement 
for the exchange of wool for cash, and these risks are likely to have been reflected in the prices paid 
or received for the wool.  
 
On the abbots’ side, the only real risk was that they had contracted to supply something that they 
later found themselves unable to deliver. Since the abbots could have no idea whether their flock 
would be diseased in ten years time, this was a significant risk that they had no way to hedge or 
insure against.
22
 The abbeys are unlikely to have faced any risk that the merchants would default 
because they had usually received much of or all of the specified money due at the time of signing 
the contract.  
 
On the merchants’ side, the potential risks are more numerous, but arguably less catastrophic in 
most cases. These risks, which are nicely summarised by Eldridge and Maltby (1993, p.44) include 
 The risk of default due to disease in the sheep 
 The risk of deliberate default by a dishonest monastery 
 The risk of seizure of the wool by the crown, or of the imposition of taxes. 
 The risk that a debt-ridden abbey will declare itself bankrupt to be taken into royal custody.   
 
The contracts that have been investigated give some indication of whether default occurred. Of the 
226 contracts documented only 49 state that the delivery was made in full. We cannot make any 
assumptions concerning the outcomes of those contracts that do not specify either that the delivery 
occurred in full or that there was a default. Therefore, the default rate appears to be about 12%. 
However, particularly in times of widespread sheep disease, the probability of default is likely to 
have been much higher than this. In the case of default, the records suggest that the “recovery rate” 
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for the merchants was about half of the volume of wool specified in the contract. More often, 
though, the king’s willingness to protect ailing monasteries coupled with the merchants’ desire to 
maintain a grip on the sources of best quality wool led in most cases of default to a renegotiation of 
the original contract, frequently skewed more in the merchants’ favour but giving the abbot a more 
practical timetable for delivery. The ultimate indirect penalty, of course, could be dissolution of the 
monastery, although this would not help the merchants since an amount equivalent to the value of 
the default would be paid to the crown from monastic assets, not to the merchants. While short-term 
bankruptcies did occur at Flaxley, Kirkstall and Rievaulx, for example, the general pattern tended 
towards renegotiation and survival rather than this most severe of consequences.
23
  
 
In consequence, the presence of a risk premium has not been ruled out, but given the available data, 
it is impossible to test explicitly for this. Interestingly, at the time of the wool forward contracts, 
finding a proxy for the “risk-free rate” would be impossible since the Medieval equivalent of 
Treasury securities, loans to the Crown, were frequently defaulted upon. Therefore, it would not be 
possible to separate out any “risk premium” from the base (risk-free) rate of interest within the 
overall interest rate implied in the transaction. 
 
The impact on the merchant of the wool seller defaulting is unclear, and would depend on whether 
the merchant had already sold the wool on to a third party. Damages to cover default were 
sometimes specified in the terms of the contract. If he had not, the maximum potential loss would 
be the advance payment made, plus any foregone return on the sum that could have been earned 
between payment of advance and default. But if the merchant was also obliged to deliver the wool, 
and had to purchase the wool at the prevailing spot price, the loss could be more substantial. In 
summary, the possibility of one of the counterparties defaulting on the contract agreement will only 
affect the prices if either one party is more risky than the other or if one party would be affected 
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more adversely by a default than the other. Both parties faced risks and it is not obvious which were 
the greater.  
 
One would have expected that the probability of default would be higher the longer the contract, 
and therefore that the merchants would have been prepared to pay less per sack for longer contracts 
implying a higher rate of interest on the loan component. There seems to be no evidence for this 
among the contracts that we studied, since the correlation between the length of the contract and the 
discount of the price paid per sack relative to the prevailing market price was –0.18. Thus slightly 
higher prices per sack were paid on average for longer contracts, perhaps suggesting that the 
merchants valued a continuing supply of wool more highly than they did the additional risk. There 
is also evidence that merchants were sometimes willing to pay inflated prices in a deliberate attempt 
to preclude rival merchants from obtaining wool supplies. 
 
4.5 Were the Forward Prices Specified in the Contracts Unbiased and Were the Markets Efficient? 
A further issue worthy of investigation is the extent to which the forward rate unbiasedness (FRU) 
hypothesis held in the medieval wool market. This hypothesis states that (in the absence of 
transactions costs and other impediments to the effective functioning of the markets), the forward 
price should be an unbiased predictor of the subsequent spot price. Such analyses have been 
conducted extensively in the context of exchange rates (see, for example Hansen and Hodrick, 1980 
or Goodhart et al., 1992). Clearly, however, the wool market is unlikely to have been frictionless 
and available data are limited, but it is nonetheless of interest to investigate whether this relation 
holds using a regression model of the following type
24
 
kttktttkttktkt uFScFSbaFS   )()( 1,111,1,     (3) 
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 The variables in this equation are often employed in their logarithmic forms, but for ease of interpretation, we use the 
levels here. 
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where ktS   is the spot price prevailing at time t+k, ktF , is the forward price for k periods ahead 
available at time t, and so on, and ut is an error term.
25
 Some researchers may suggest that 
significance of the parameters b1 or c1 in equation (3) is not indicative of inefficiency since these do 
not imply an unexploited arbitrage opportunity, but we would argue that if the market is functioning 
properly, there should be no information from previous forecast errors that could be used to predict 
the next period forecast error. If the market is efficient, these forecast errors should be uncorrelated.  
 
A natural joint hypothesis to test is H0: a = 0 and b1 = 0 and c1 = 0. If equation (3) is estimated using 
OLS, then this joint hypothesis can be examined using an F-test. This hypothesis represents the 
restriction that the deviation of the forward rate from the realised rate at time t+1 should have a 
mean value insignificantly different from zero (a = 0) and it should be independent of any 
information available at time t (b1 = 0 and c1 = 0). This hypothesis represents a joint test of FRU 
and of the efficiency of the spot and forward markets, although simpler test of FRU alone would 
simply focus on a, with both of the other parameters set to zero. We employ a pooled sample of 
data from 67 different contracts, some with only one batch for forward delivery and others with up 
to 20, totalling 277 observations on the forward prices from the contracts and spot prices relating to 
those delivery dates.  
 
It should already be evident from the analysis above that in modern financial parlance, the forward 
price will be a downwardly biased predictor of the future spot price, and therefore a would be 
expected to be significantly positive and thus there will be normal backwardation.
26
 However, it is 
still of interest to consider whether the markets were efficient, although it is only possible to 
conduct such an examination using the lagged spot prices, and not on the lagged difference between 
the spot and forward prices, )( ,kktt FS  . The latter quantity is not available since our sample 
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 However, this arises from the loan component of the transaction rather than as compensation for speculators as may 
be the case for modern commodity forwards. 
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involves a series of forward prices that are not continuous through time. We are able to run a 
regression including this variable with a lead of one period as the regressand where each 
observation arises from a separate contract rather than the same contract at different points in time, 
but not also as a regressor since the “lagged” forecast error would be from a different contract. Thus 
we consider lagged influences of the change in the spot price on ktkt FS ,  since we have a series of 
time-adjusted prices for the wool from each abbey or region. We will term ktkt FS ,  the “forecast 
error” to avoid confusion with the basis.27  
 
We first run a regression of ktkt FS ,  on a constant only to determine the average value of this 
dependent variable, and we obtain aˆ  = 416.78, with a standard error of 49.36 (p-value 0.000). Thus, 
ignoring all other influences, the typical price per sack received by the sheep breeders is 417d lower 
than they would have received on the open market. Next, we reduce the sample to consider only the 
first year of any contract (thus setting k = 1 in equation 2). We do this firstly because the forward 
prices per sack in the agreements are almost always identical for the life of the contract, and 
secondly, because we want to ensure that when we test for efficiency, we are only employing 
current and lagged prices that would have been in the information sets of those forming the 
agreements. This reduces the number of available observations to 63. We thus run a regression of 
the following form estimated using OLS 
ititititititit uSSbSSbaFS ,1,2,12,1,1,1,,1 )()(     ,   i = 1, …, 63. (4) 
where St+1,i denotes the spot price for contract i prevailing at time t+1, and Ft,1,i is the forward price 
for contract i and for delivery 1 period (year) ahead, made at time t. We also want to examine 
formally the relationship between the forecast error and the length of the contract and between the 
forecast error and the size of the contract (the total number of sacks to be delivered). This leads to 
the regression 
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      itiiitititititit ulengthbsacksbSSbSSbaFS ,143,2,12,1,1,1,,1 )()(      (5) 
 
Finally, we are also interested in determining the impact of the monastic order on the forecast error. 
Unfortunately, we have insufficient number of contracts for the individual orders to be able to 
examine this within a regression framework, so we instead consider the impact of belonging to any 
religious order. We achieve this by repeating regression (5) but only for contracts where the seller 
was a member of a religious order. This further reduces the number of observations to 37.
28
  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Results of Interest Rate Calculations 
Table 2 gives summary information and calculated interest rates for the contracts that we examined. 
All prices quoted in the table are in old pence. It is not immediately obvious whether the spot prices 
used in the interest rate calculations should relate to those prevailing at the times when the wool 
was to be delivered, or whether they should be the prices quoted at the time that the contract was 
initially signed. A present value relationship would usually use the former, while the latter also 
makes sense in this case in order to use only the information that would have been available to the 
counterparties at the time when they were establishing the contract details. We employ (separately) 
both methods for determining the spot prices, and this almost always makes little difference to the 
calculated interest rates.  
 
The fourth and sixth columns of Table 2 show the total number of sacks to be delivered over the life 
of the contract, and the number of sacks per year respectively, while the fifth column gives the 
delivery dates for each batch of wool. The third column from the right of the table shows the 
forward prices per sack as specified in the contracts, and the last two columns give the interest rates 
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 An alternative approach to determining whether the spot and forward markets were informationally efficient would be 
to examine whether there existed any lead-lag relationships between the spot and forward prices, although this is not 
possible for our dataset since we do not have an evenly spaced time-series of forward prices. 
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for each spot price measure, calculated by solving the present value relationships of the form given 
in equation (2) to find r for each contract.  
 
Of course, there will be situations where our spot prices are somewhat inaccurate (for example, if 
Lloyd’s prices are based on a very small sample for a particular region in a particular year), or 
where the spot prices changed substantially between when the contract was enrolled and when the 
wool was due for delivery. There may also be case-specific details of which we are unaware (for 
example, a monastery being unable to secure a good price for its wool owing to previous defaults). 
These factors may result in negative calculated interest rates, which we set to zero in the table, or 
implausibly high rates of interest. Examining the last two columns of Table 2, there are evidently 
some zero rates and some implausibly high rates. But for the majority of contracts that we 
investigated, and that were amenable to this analysis, the implied rates of interest are not only 
plausible, but are also in accordance with other historical studies detailing interest rates on 
alternative types of transactions at that time. For example, Eldridge and Maltby cite Mate (1973), 
who studied loans to Canterbury cathedral priory, where interest rates ranged from 15%-24% per 
annum, and Gilchrist (1969, p.298), who suggested that loans to the church commanded interest 
rates of 15%-38%. Employing the spot prices that prevailed when the contract was signed for the 
whole lifetime of the contract gives a median interest rate per annum of 22%; using the spot prices 
that prevailed at each delivery date gives a median rate of 18% per annum; the majority of implied 
interest rates are between 10% and 40%.  
 
Eldridge and Maltby’s study used data from a contract made between the Fountains Abbey in 
Yorkshire and a consortium of Florentine merchants, enrolled on 15 October 1276
29
 (the second 
contract on our list in Table 2). They calculated interest rates of between 40% and 60% per annum, 
depending on assumptions made concerning the spot rate. However, they used a different approach 
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to determining the spot prices (that we would argue is less accurate than the method employed 
here).  They assumed that the time until delivery of the first batch of wool was a year when in fact it 
was nine months, and they did not allow for the fact that collecta wool was to be delivered under the 
contract rather than the monastery’s own wool, whereas we account for this. Our calculated interest 
rates for this contract are 17% and 22% (depending on the dates used to determine the spot prices), 
figures much closer to those usually quoted for financial transactions during the thirteenth century.  
 
5.2 Results of Wool Market Efficiency Tests 
Table 3 presents the results of the test regressions for market efficiency. Comparing the sizes of the 
intercept parameters across the regressions for all sellers and for monastic sellers only, it is again 
evident that the latter obtained a worse deal, with heavier discounts relative to the high price that 
their good wool could have obtained if sold in the year it was sheared. The sizes and statistical 
significances of the intercepts in all four regressions are clear evidence that the contract forward 
prices were biased, but were the markets efficient? That is, was there information that would have 
been available to the counterparties at the time the contract was signed that was not incorporated 
into the deal? Although they all have the same positive sign, none of the one period lagged spot 
price changes are significant in the regressions, and only the two period lagged price changes are 
significant in the “all seller” regressions. The final column of Table 3 presents the F-test statistics 
for examining the joint null hypothesis that b1=b2 =0. As can be seen, for all sellers, the statistic is 
only significant at the 10% level, while for monastic sellers only, it is not even significant at the 
20% level. This can be interpreted as suggesting that only to a limited degree could old information 
from the spot market have been used to predict the subsequent forecast error. It would therefore be 
concluded that, by comparison with studies on modern day financial markets, the Medieval wool 
markets were fairly efficient. In particular, there is no evidence that the forecast error could have 
been predicted using this stale information when the sellers were abbots.  
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Comparing these results with existing studies on the efficiency of modern wool markets suggests 
that broadly the same conclusions were reached. The efficiency of the Australian wool market is 
investigated by Praetz (1975) using a number of statistical tests applied to daily data. His results 
suggest that the returns are essentially independent from one another, indicating that from this 
perspective, the market is indeed efficient. Only a spectral analysis indicates a possible departure 
from randomness, but this is attributed to likely seasonal patterns in the returns. Goss (1987), on the 
other hand, employs a similar approach to that used here based on a Hansen and Hodrick (1980) 
regression of the Sydney wool futures price forecasting error on previous forecasting errors from 
Sydney and other futures markets. He finds some evidence of inefficiency at the 2 month lead 
horizon (i.e. where the time to maturity of the futures contract is 2 months), but this mispricing is 
corrected when only one month to maturity remains. This inefficiency, according to Goss, may be 
explained by lower trading volume over the sample period than had previously been the case, 
leading to slower price adjustment.  
 
More recently, Goss (1990) and Graham-Higgs et al. (1999) also both examine the Australian wool 
spot-futures price relationship. Goss (1990) employs a simultaneous equations model that allows for 
inventory sizes and the roles of speculators and hedgers. He finds that information from the model 
is useful for predicting subsequent spot prices, but urges caution in interpreting this as evidence for 
market inefficiency. Graham-Higgs et al. use an error correction model, finding that wool spot and 
futures prices are cointegrated, but that the speed of adjustment following deviations from 
equilibrium is slow, particularly for longer dated futures. Thus, even for these modern contracts that 
are highly liquid and tradable on a formal exchange, the evidence for efficiency is mixed. When 
considered in this light, the medieval wool forward market was remarkably well-functioning and 
orderly.  
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Finally, there seems to be virtually neither a relationship between the contract size (total number of 
sacks to be delivered) and the forecast error, nor between the length of the contract period and the 
forecast error. Sellers of larger quantities who were to deliver quickly (i.e. short contracts) would 
generate the smallest forward pricing discounts relative to market prices, as one would expect. 
However, the small sizes of the coefficients and their lack of statistical significance mean that we 
should not read too much into these results.   
 
6. Conclusions 
Our study has documented the existence of a large number of agreements for the advance sale of 
wool, formed mainly between Italian merchants and monastic orders in England. We have 
calculated the interest rates implied in these transactions to typically be of the order 10-40%, and 
we have investigated the informational efficiency of the market, finding limited evidence of 
predictability in the forecast errors. We also conducted an examination of the efficiency of the 
medieval English wool spot and forward markets, finding little evidence of inefficiencies in the 
sense that stale information could be used to predict future market outcomes. This paper adds to the 
growing body of evidence that those transacting in the medieval economy were much more 
financially aware than modern commentators give them credit for, and thus it seems that “modern 
finance” is perhaps not so modern after all, and that valuation formulae developed in the past few 
decades were implicitly in use over 700 years ago. 
 
Our research suggests several potentially fruitful avenues for further study. First, it would be of 
interest to examine in greater detail the financial positions of the abbeys. Was there, for example, a 
relationship between the state of their finances and the forward price discount? It may be that 
knowledgeable merchants were able to exploit the monasteries in trouble that were the most 
desperate for cash. Second, is there a relationship between the likelihood of default and the size of 
the forward price discount? Clearly, monasteries that had sold their wool the most cheaply relative 
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to prevailing prices would have the strongest incentives to renege on the deal when the wool 
became available. Finally, the existence of the advance contracts for the sale of wool that we have 
investigated appears to be a historically unique phenomenon as they are confined to a short period 
at the close of the thirteenth century. As well as investigating other aspects of these contracts in 
greater detail, such as the credit risk that the merchants faced when they made up-front payments to 
the monasteries, future research may investigate why the forward agreements died out almost as 
quickly as they arose. 
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Table 1: Wool Price Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value 
mean 4.615 
variance 0.585 
skewness 0.216 
kurtosis 0.109 
AR(1) 0.762 
AR(2) 0.755 
AR(3) 0.518 
DF-statistic -2.982 
Notes: AR(j) is the autocorrelation coefficient at lag j;  
DF is the Dickey-Fuller test, with 5% critical value –2.86. 
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Table 2: Results of Interest Rate Calculations 
Estimated date of 
enrolment 
Spot at 
date wool 
due 
Spot at 
date 
contract 
signing 
Total sacks 
over 
contract 
Due dates for 
delivery 
Sacks 
each year Quality 
Price 
(d/sack) 
Interest rate - 
spot at wool 
due 
Interest rate - 
spot at 
contract 
signing 
17 November 1259 1595 1311 10 1 July 1261 10 Good 800 53 36 
15 October 1276 2904 3022 62 9 July 1277 17 Collecta 1800 22 17 
 3606 3022  9 July 1278 17 Collecta 1800   
 3544 3022  9 July 1279 14 Collecta 1800   
 2922 3022  9 July 1280 14 Collecta 1800   
5 February 1280 2338 2338 53 9 July 1280 25 Good 2000 0 0 
 2109 2338  9 July 1282 28 Good 2000   
20 May 1280 1802 3117 20 24 June 1280 10 Good 1600 31 448 
 1932 3117  24 June 1281 10 Good 1600   
9 October 1281 2109 1462 3 2 July 1282 3 Good 1760 22 0 
21 November 1281 3277 4178 8 9 July 1291 6 Good 1120 9 12 
12 October 1282 1888 1933 3 1 August 1283 1.5 Good 1280 34 34 
 1865 1933  1 August 1284 1.5 Good 1280   
9 October 1284 2882 3730 10 9 July 1285 10 Good 2400 28 28 
8 July 1286 2174 2126 23 24 June 1287 13 Collecta 2080 0 0 
 2193 2126  24 June 1288 10 Collecta 2080   
12 May 1287 2343 2268 11 9 July 1289 11 Good 2400 0 0 
25 June 1287 2288 2268 30 9 July 1288 30 Good 1600 45 44 
27 June 1287 2288 1323 19 24 June 1288 13 Good 1760 30 30 
    24 June 1288 6 Good 1760   
13 October 1287 2288 2268 26 9 July 1288 10 Collecta 1920 0 0 
 2288 2268  24 June 1288 8 Good 2560   
 2343 2268  24 June 1289 8 Good 2560   
17 October 1287 2288 1323 8 24 June 1288 8 Good 1760 48 48 
24 November 1287 3432 3402 5 1 September 1288 5 Collecta 1360 160 157 
27 November 1287 1525 1512 400 2 February 1288 80 Collecta 1000 12 11 
 1562 1512  2 February 1289 80 Collecta 1000   
 1655 1512  2 February 1290 80 Collecta 1000   
 1542 1512  2 February 1291 80 Collecta 1000   
 1350 1512  2 February 1292 80 Collecta 1000   
16 October 1288 2148 2097 6 24 June 1289 2 Good 1760 14 11 
 2275 2097  24 June 1290 2 Good 1760   
 2120 2097  24 June 1291 2 Good 1760   
3 November 1288 2343 2288 11 9 July 1289 2 Good 2400 0 0 
 2482 2288  9 July 1290 4 Good 2400   
 2313 2288  9 July 1291 5 Good 2400   
27 November 1290 1156 1241 30 24 June 1291 5 Good 960 0 9 
 1012 1241  24 June 1292 5 Good 960   
 1092 1241  24 June 1293 5 Good 960   
 960 1241  24 June 1294 5 Good 960   
 669 1241  24 June 1295 5 Good 960   
 900 1241  24 June 1296 5 Good 960   
9 October 1292 1820 2868 11 15 July 1293 6 Good 1920 6 62 
 1600 2868  15 July 1294 6 Good 1920   
29 October 1292 2730 2531 10 22 July 1293 10 Good 2240 31 18 
7 April 1293 2730 3457 12 9 July 1293 6 Good 1280 231 510 
 2400 3457  9 July 1294 6 Good 1280   
 29 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regression Results of Tests for Market Efficiency 
Model: itiiitititititit ulengthbsacksbSSbSSbaFS ,143,2,12,1,1,1,,1 )()(    
Panel A: All Sellers 
 a b1 b2 b3 b4 H0: b1=b2 =0 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
497.35 
(116.24)** 
0.50 
(0.34) 
0.78 
(0.41)* 
- - 2.59 
(0.08) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
489.76 
(147.77)** 
0.40 
(0.36) 
0.81 
(0.42)* 
-0.56 
(2.44) 
0.42 
(2.77) 
- 
Panel B: Sellers are Members of a Monastic Order 
 a b1 b2 b3 b4 H0: b1=b2 =0 
Coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
504.58 
(170.08)** 
0.10 
(0.53) 
0.65 
(0.71) 
- - 0.42 
(0.66) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
551.02 
(251.29)** 
0.01 
(0.62) 
0.67 
(0.79) 
-0.30 
(3.08) 
0.16 
(3.55) 
- 
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. H0: b1=b2=0 presents F-statistics (p-values in 
parentheses) for this efficiency test. 
 
